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SIXTY-FIVE ORAL ARGUMENTS WERE NOT 
ENOUGH: A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE STEVENS 
FROM ACROSS THE BENCH 
Carter G. Phillips* 
I first heard the name John Paul Stevens in 1975. I had just finished my 
first year as a law student at Northwestern Law School and was working on 
a master’s degree in political science as part of a joint-degree program when 
President Ford announced then-Judge Stevens’s nomination to the Supreme 
Court. Like everyone at the Law School, I was excited that a Northwestern 
Law alumnus was going to be elevated to the Supreme Court, but candidly, 
I never expected his presence there to have much of an impact on my 
professional life. Although the focus in this Essay will be the relationship 
between the Justice and me that developed over decades while he sat on the 
Supreme Court, and I stood at the podium or sat at counsel table during oral 
arguments, I have a couple of memories about the Justice that provide 
context for my deep admiration of him. 
After his confirmation to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens began 
hiring Northwestern Law alumni as his law clerks. He hired one each from 
the two graduating classes ahead of mine, and both of them had clerked for 
the same judge for whom I clerked after I graduated, Judge Robert A. 
Sprecher. The Judge and Justice Stevens had been very close friends during 
their tenure together on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit before Justice Stevens was “promoted.” It was because of Justice 
Stevens’s presence on the Supreme Court and apparent willingness to 
consider Northwestern students as possible clerks that I decided to apply for 
a clerkship. A clerkship on the Court no longer seemed like a fantasy. 
As it happened, Justice Stevens did not even interview me. For the 1978 
Term, the Justice decided to reduce the number of law clerks in his Chambers 
to two (he was entitled to four and in his first three years on the Court had 
hired only three), and he had hired the Presidents of the Harvard and Stanford 
Law Reviews, before I had even sent in my application. When I interviewed 
the Justice after he retired at a public event at the Law School in 2016, he 
asked me why I had not applied to clerk for him. I told him that I had. He 
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very kindly commented that not giving me a chance was one of the many 
mistakes he had made during his time on the Court. In truth, he did not make 
a mistake; he had two outstanding clerks that Term. But even though I did 
not get the clerkship I thought was my best opportunity, I had the good 
fortune to be hired to clerk for Chief Justice Warren Burger that Term. 
Without Justice Stevens, I am not certain that would have happened. 
Law clerks typically have a lot of interaction with their own Justice, but 
they tend to have quite limited contact with the others. My experience with 
Justice Stevens was, however, a bit unusual. One day I was in his law clerks’ 
office talking about some case when the Justice walked in unexpectedly. I 
apologized and started to make my way out, when Justice Stevens said: “No, 
stay. I value your input as much as anyone else’s.” I doubt that was 
completely true, but it was very kind, and I did stick around and offered my 
two cents about whatever case he drifted in to discuss. I believe he was the 
rare Justice who engaged freely and happily with any law clerk. 
Even more remarkably, when Justice Stevens learned that my co-clerk, 
Chris Walsh, and I were considering returning to Chicago to practice law 
after our clerkships, he reached out and invited us to join him for lunch to 
talk about practicing law with private firms in Chicago. To be sure, it was 
not an elegant setting; we met with him in the cafeteria in the basement of 
the Supreme Court (twice). Not surprisingly, he had very high praise about 
his law firm, Rothschild, Barry & Myers, which he had cofounded. Chris, in 
fact, went there after his clerkship. The Justice also had nothing but 
compliments for the lawyers at Sidley & Austin, where I had summered and 
where I would end up five years later (albeit in the Washington, D.C. office). 
I came away with two special memories from those lunches. The first 
was how overwhelmed and appreciative I felt that the Justice would spend 
as much time as he did with us in order to give us candid and valuable advice 
about becoming practicing lawyers, particularly in Chicago. The second was 
how shocked I was that the three of us could sit in a public eating area 
surrounded by Court visitors without anyone seeming to recognize that the 
Justice was sitting among them. By contrast, my co-clerks and I went to the 
same cafeteria with the Chief Justice on one occasion and spent ninety 
percent of the time being introduced to visitors who came up to the table to 
say hello to the Chief and ask if they could take his picture. And that was 
long before the days of iPhone cameras and selfies. 
Instead of going back to Chicago after my clerkship, however, I went 
to the University of Illinois to teach law and then joined the Solicitor 
General’s Office in 1981. I argued my first case in front of Justice Stevens 
in January 1982, which was Justice O’Connor’s first Term on the bench, 
meaning that Justice Stevens was no longer the junior Justice on the Court. 
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That case was McElroy v. United States.1 It involved the question of whether 
a criminal statute that outlaws transporting forged securities in interstate 
commerce was violated by the defendant presenting a check obtained in Ohio 
to a merchant in Pennsylvania without proof that the forgery itself had taken 
place before the check was transported across state lines.2 
The case is largely forgettable but for the fact that the opinion for the 
Court was written by Justice O’Connor and was one of her first two or three 
opinions as a Supreme Court Justice. Justice Stevens wrote a solo dissent, a 
not uncommon occurrence, which meant that the United States prevailed by 
an 8–1 vote. What was particularly memorable about the argument were the 
questions from Justice White and Justice Stevens. Because the check in the 
case undeniably was carried across state lines, I focused on that fact to 
demonstrate that the interstate commerce requirement had been satisfied. 
Justice White wanted to know whether it made any difference that the check 
itself moved across the border as long as the defendant did so in the process 
of trying to avoid having his forgery detected.3 
It was never clear to me whether Justice White was simply giving a 
rookie advocate a hard time or not, but it quickly became obvious that Justice 
White’s questioning triggered genuine concern in Justice Stevens who 
followed up with one of his famous hypotheticals: 
Suppose you have the same facts you have here, except as Justice White 
suggests, the theft was from Pittsburgh, but yet he lived in Ohio, and he called 
up from the Ohio Turnpike to Beaver Falls and said, I am on my way in, I am 
going to pick up the check in Pittsburgh and deliver it to you. He did exactly 
that, but it was a forged check. Wasn’t that exactly like this case?4 
I said no, because in our case the check in fact had moved across state lines, 
which made it a much easier case. But what became clear to me was that 
Justice White (along with the rest of the Court) was comfortable with the 
idea that the check did not need to cross state lines to violate the statute, and 
he simply wanted me to embrace that theory of the case. By contrast, Justice 
Stevens found that idea very troubling and even wondered what the federal 
interest would be if the check itself never made it out of Pennsylvania as in 
his hypothetical.5 In some ways, his question anticipated the Court’s later 
decisions limiting Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.6 That 
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the oral argument influenced the Justice’s vote is made plain in his dissent 
where he argued: “Under the Court’s analysis, petitioner would have violated 
§ 2314 if he had left his home in Ohio, picked up a forged check in 
Pittsburgh, and negotiated it in Beaver Falls.”7 
Justice Stevens thought this was beyond what Congress intended. At 
the end of the day, my client won the case, but I did not succeed in persuading 
Justice Stevens. This was the first, but not the last time that would be true. 
In the ensuing twenty-eight Terms, I had the privilege of arguing before 
Justice Stevens sixty-four more times before he retired from the Court. What 
never ceased to amaze me was how unfailingly gracious he was. He routinely 
apologized for interrupting arguing counsel, which, of course, was 
unnecessary. We all know that the argument time is the Justices’ time, not 
the lawyer’s. Still, his style was unique and endearing. 
Two other facets of his style at oral argument were humility and wit. I 
was in the courtroom the day when a lawyer referred to him as Judge Stevens 
and then immediately apologized. Justice Stevens, obviously not as 
concerned about the moniker as some members of the Court (the Clerk of 
the Court tells arguing counsel not to refer to any of the Justices as “Judge”), 
immediately reassured the flustered lawyer: “Well, your mistake in calling 
me Judge is also made in Article III of the Constitution, by the way.”8 Article 
III, Section One specifically refers to “Judges” of the “supreme” Court. 
What made Justice Stevens’s understated style of asking questions 
particularly powerful was the contrast of that style with the questions’ 
content: His questions were often the hardest ones counsel would face during 
the argument. One of my favorite memories of an exchange with Justice 
Stevens was not in a case I argued. My then-partner and good friend, Rex 
Lee, argued on behalf of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) in a case against Jerry Tarkanian, the former head basketball coach 
of the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV).9 
The issue in the case was whether the NCAA could be considered a 
state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because of its actions in connection with the suspension of Coach Tarkanian 
by UNLV, which as a state university is a state actor.10 Justice Stevens, who 
I believe was the best hypothetical questioner on the Court (evidenced also 
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 7 McElroy, 455 U.S. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 9 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
 10 Id. at 191–92. 
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by his question in McElroy quoted above), asked Tarkanian’s counsel the 
following: 
Well, let me give you this example. Supposing United Airlines tells O’Hare 
Airport in Chicago that we won’t land here anymore, because we think your 
airport manager is doing a sloppy job of turning on the lights, or something like 
that, at night. They just say, we won’t do it.   And O’Hare says, 
well, we can’t operate without United, so we’ll fire him. Would United become 
a state actor because they have enough economic power to insist on that kind of 
result?11 
The transcript then reads: “The mere—if you—” and, if you listen to 
the tape of the oral argument, there is a long silence, which is interrupted by 
Justice Scalia interjecting: “You want to try to say no,” which is followed in 
the transcript by “[Laughter].”12 I remember often seeing lawyers standing at 
the podium after Justice Stevens would ask a question like his “O’Hare” 
hypothetical, and you could see from the expression on their faces that they 
knew there was a trap in the hypothetical, but they often could not figure out 
what would be worse, saying yes or saying no. 
My favorite oral argument exchange between Justice Stevens and 
arguing counsel occurred when I was not in the courtroom. In Grutter v. 
Bollinger, which was the challenge to the constitutionality of the University 
of Michigan Law School’s admissions process,13 my law firm, Sidley Austin, 
filed a brief on behalf of retired military officers. In that brief, we argued that 
the United States military academies rely upon affirmative action in their 
admissions in order to ensure a racially integrated officer corps, which is 
critical to our national security.14 We further contended that the admissions 
process at Michigan’s law school was not materially different and that both 
systems should be constitutional.15 
I need to make a disclaimer here. Although my name was at the top of 
the brief, my partner, Virginia Seitz, took the laboring oar in preparing the 
amicus brief, and for that reason she was listed as counsel of record. The 
brief was the subject of some back and forth between Justice Ginsburg and 
petitioner’s counsel early in the oral argument.16 But the role of the brief 
became much more important later in the oral argument (at least for me) 
when the Solicitor General went to the podium to argue in support of 
petitioner. 
 
 11 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (No. 87-1061). 
 12 Id.  
 13 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 14 Id. at 330–31. 
 15 See id.  
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After the first sentence of argument, Justice Stevens politely interrupted 
as follows: 
General Olson, just let me get a question out and you answer it at your 
convenience. I’d like you to comment on Carter Phillips’ brief. What is your 
view of the strength of that argument?17 
Two things are striking about this question. First, it reflects Justice 
Stevens’s remarkable gentility, which I have already noted, in asking 
questions— “answer it at your convenience.” It should not surprise anyone 
that the Solicitor General responded immediately. Second, I was 
unbelievably flattered to have the Justice use my name to identify the brief. 
The recognition was undeserved, but the publicity was great. I have long 
suspected that he did it because we are both Northwestern Law School 
alums, but I could never work up the nerve to ask him that question. 
Over the years, actually decades, I developed a very warm relationship 
with Justice Stevens. He always nodded to me with a smile when he walked 
onto the bench and, of course, he treated me with the same cordiality he 
extended to all arguing counsel. I cannot say that my record with the Justice 
reflected any special deference to my arguments. I lost his vote in thirty-four 
of the sixty-five I cases I argued before him. And technically, I only argued 
sixty-four times in his presence. On the day of one case I argued in the Court, 
Washington, D.C. suffered a twenty-two-plus inch snow storm, and I had to 
get a ride to One First Street with Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice 
Stevens had even tougher transportation woes. His flight from Florida was 
cancelled, and he missed the argument (along with Justice Souter), although 
he no doubt read the transcript. He joined Justice Thomas’s opinion for a 
unanimous Court in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Hiles.18 
I wish I could say that my last argument before Justice Stevens was one 
for the ages but, sadly, it was not. I represented Alabama and other States, 
along with an interstate Compact of States, in an original action against 
North Carolina where my clients sued North Carolina for breach of the 
Compact involving building a nuclear waste disposal site.19 The very last 
question Justice Stevens asked was about how the money that would be 
generated by the site (had it been built) would have been distributed among 
the Compact’s members.20 It was a straightforward question about the 
mechanics of the Compact, which reflected another trait of many of Justice 
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Stevens’s questions: they dug into the nuts and bolts of the dispute in front 
of the Court. He was just as interested in the minutiae as he was in the big 
picture legal issues; he had a complete grasp of both aspects of a case. And, 
he had amazing intellectual curiosity. Because of the breadth of his potential 
concerns, I always prepared for arguments not only at the level of broad legal 
principles, but also by getting into the weeds of the factual setting in a case, 
knowing that Justice Stevens might ask a question as simple as, “How does 
all of this work?” 
Like everyone else, I had no idea that the Justice would announce his 
retirement at the end of the 2009 Term. It was a sad day for me because I 
knew I would miss his welcoming smile when he walked onto the bench, his 
gracious way of asking questions, and even the minefield of his 
hypotheticals, all of which made his role on the bench very special to me 
personally. Others in this Symposium will focus on him as a boss and as a 
brilliant jurist, but my strongest memories of the Justice came from his 
unique and inspiring role during oral argument: He was both the gentlest and 
the toughest questioner on the Court for thirty-five years. 
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